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DRAFT: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SELECTIVE 
SERVICE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR 
 
BILL RALEY* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that a key-but-overlooked factor in the Vietnam-era breakdown 
of the draft system was the Supreme Court’s expansion of the religious conscientious 
objector (“CO”) exemption. It asserts that the Court understood that the CO exemption 
violated the Establishment Clause, but rather than strike the exemption down, the 
Court avoided the constitutional issue by interpreting away the religious element of 
CO statutes. The Article concludes that the Court’s rulings caused CO exemptions to 
skyrocket, which in turn caused the draft system to collapse toward the end of the 
Vietnam War. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most profound legacy of the Vietnam War was the demise of the draft. 
Today’s all-volunteer force is, in the words of former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, “a clear 
result of the Vietnam war.”1 The conventional wisdom is that the brutality and 
unpopularity of that war created “tremendous pressure to end the draft at almost any 
price.”2 But the assumption that Vietnam was “a different kind of war”3 that provoked 
a different kind of backlash overlooks the fact that Vietnam was not America’s first 
(or even most) brutal and unpopular war,4 and that the draft has always been a source 
of serious civil unrest.5 This raises the question: what was it about Vietnam that pushed 
the draft past its breaking point? 
This Article argues that a key, but overlooked, factor in the Vietnam-era 
breakdown of the draft system was the Supreme Court’s expansion of the religious 
conscientious objector (“CO”) exemption. It asserts that the Court knew that the CO 
exemption violated the Establishment Clause, but rather than strike it down, the Court 
avoided the issue by interpreting away the religious element of CO statutes. The 
Article concludes that the Court’s rulings caused CO exemptions to skyrocket, which 
in turn caused the draft system to collapse towards the end of the Vietnam War. 
Part I of this Article describes the historical evolution of both the CO exemption 
and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, showing that by the Vietnam War era, the 
CO exemption rested on very shaky constitutional grounds. Part II analyzes the CO 
exemption cases that reached the Court during the Vietnam War, and how the Court’s 
decision to broaden the statutory definition of religion, rather than declare the 
exemption unconstitutional, fatally undermined the draft system. Part III addresses the 
postwar legacy of the Court’s CO exemption cases, showing that they were cited by 
President Ford’s controversial presidential clemency board as justification for liberally 
offering pardons to draft evaders who cited matters of conscience as their motive. Part 
IV concludes that, if the draft is ever reinstated, the CO exemption will have to be 
abolished. 
 
1 BERNARD ROSTKER, I WANT YOU! THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 15 n.3 
(2006). 
2 Id. 
3 “A Different Kind of War” was the title of a major study about the Johnson Administration’s 
actions during its escalation of the Vietnam War. GEORGE C. HERRING, LBJ AND VIETNAM: A 
DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR (1994). 
4 In regard to brutality, more U.S. soldiers were killed in the trenches of WWI in just a year-
and-a-half than in the jungles of Vietnam over two decades. The horrors of WWI and lack of 
support for U.S. involvement are reflected by the fact that more fighting-age men unlawfully 
evaded the draft than were actually conscripted. Jeanette Keith, The Politics of Southern Draft 
Resistance, 1917-1918: Class, Race, and Conscription in the Rural South, 87 J. AM. HIST. 1335, 
1336 (2001). 
5 For example, the first federal draft, implemented during the Civil War, provoked the New 
York City Draft Riots, which remains “the largest civil insurrection in American history apart 
from the South’s rebellion itself.” ERIC FONER, THE NEW AMERICAN HISTORY 95 (1997). 
Resistance to the draft during WWI drove Congress to pass the Espionage Act of 1917, which 
marked the beginning of the domestic surveillance state. PAUL JOSEPH, THE SAGE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WAR: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 521–22 (2016). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/5
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION  
This Part provides a historical overview of the CO exemption leading up to the 
Vietnam War era. It shows that the CO exemption was conceived as an 
accommodation of pacifists by colonies and early states, and posed no constitutional 
problems at its inception. But when Congress enacted the first federal CO exemption 
at the behest of peace churches during the Civil War, this exemption likely violated 
the Establishment Clause. Congress again included CO exemptions in conscription 
bills passed during WWI, WWII, and the Korean War, and these exemptions were also 
constitutionally-suspect. This Part concludes that by the beginning of the Vietnam 
War, the inherent constitutional problems posed by the CO exemption had not been 
confronted nor resolved. 
A. Origin and Early Development of the CO Exemption 
The practice of exempting conscientious objectors from conscription dates back to 
the earliest years of British colonization of North America. At that time, the colonies 
relied on the local militia system for defense against Native Americans and rival 
colonial powers, and each colony, except Quaker Pennsylvania, required every able-
bodied male property owner to serve in the militia.6 Pacifist Protestants began 
immigrating to the colonies in large numbers in the second half of the seventeenth 
century, and immediately ran into trouble with the law when they refused to perform 
their militia duties.7 
The pacifists were initially subjected to fines, jail sentences, and property 
confiscation for violating conscription laws, but “the leaders of the colonial 
governments gradually worked out accommodations with the pacifist religious 
communities.”8 The colonial “legislators recognized the economically productive and 
otherwise law-abiding nature of the members of these pacifist groups,”9 and also 
“came to recognize that many of the religious objectors would rather suffer and die 
than take up arms and kill other humans.”10 Faced with competitive pressures to attract 
pacifistic but otherwise model minority immigrants, and the fact that efforts to 
forcefully integrate them into the militia were believed to be futile,11 “a number of 
 
6 John Whiteclay Chambers II, Conscientious Objectors and the American State from 
Colonial Times to the Present, in THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO 
SECULAR RESISTANCE 25 (Charles Moskos & John Whiteclay Chambers II eds., 1993). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 26. 
11 An interesting historical anecdote occurred during the French and Indian Wars, when the 
need for conscripts, coupled with popular resentment of prosperous pacifists’ exemption from 
military service, led colonial governments to crack down on conscientious objection. When the 
governor of Virginia directed Col. George Washington to put Quakers in stockades and place 
them on bread and water rations until they agreed to fight, Washington declined by citing 
practical considerations. “I could by no means bring the Quakers to any terms,” he responded, 
as “[t]hey choose rather to be whipped to death than bear arms.” Id. at 27. 
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colonial legislatures provided exemptions for Quakers, Mennonites, and other 
sectarian pacifists who were conscientiously opposed to bearing arms.”12 
When the colonies declared independence from Britain, the Revolutionary 
legislatures enacted CO exemptions designed to continue the tradition of providing 
alternative service for members of the historic peace churches.13 For example, New 
York’s 1777 constitution exempted from military service “the people called Quakers 
as, from scruples of conscience, may be averse to the bearing of arms.”14 During the 
Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress (which did not have a direct role in 
conscription) passed a resolution recognizing that there were “some people who, from 
religious principles, cannot bear arms in any case,” and pled for them to support the 
revolution in ways that would not violate their conscience.15 
After the Revolutionary War was won and the Bill of Rights was being debated, 
James Madison included a CO exemption in the list of provisions he submitted for 
House consideration.16 If the provision had passed, the Second Amendment would 
have ended with a clause stating: “but no person religiously scrupulous shall be 
compelled to bear arms.”17 In a fascinating debate, Congress argued over how and 
whether to include this “indulgence” of “the Quakers,” as such an accommodation 
could lead to undue federal interference with state militias.18 
For the purposes of this Article, Pennsylvania Rep. Thomas Scott contributed the 
most interesting argument during the debate over a constitutional CO exemption. Scott 
made a prediction that was startlingly prescient of what would come to pass nearly 
two centuries later during the Vietnam War, when secular and religiously-jaded 
Americans began citing vague New Age beliefs in claiming the CO exemption. “It has 
been urged that religion is on the decline,” Scott observed. “[I]f so, the argument is 
more strong in my favor, for when the time comes that religion shall be discarded, the 
 
12 Id. at 26. 
13 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170 (1965) (noting that CO exemptions were 
“perpetuated in state statutes and constitutions” after the Revolution). 
14 N.Y. CONST. art XL (1777). 
15 CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: FROM 1774 TO 1788: IN 
FOUR VOLUMES 119 § I (Way & Gideon 1823). The resolution went on to state that “this 
Congress intends no violence to their consciences,” but then went on to “earnestly recommend” 
that they “contribute liberally in th[at] time of universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed 
brethren in the several colonies.” Id. This “earnest recommendation” was aimed at Quakers who 
controversially refused to hire substitute soldiers or pay war fines. 
16 Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of 
Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J. L. & RELIG. 367, 395 (1993-94). 
17 Id. 
18 New York Rep. Egbert Benson, for example, stated that “[h]e would always leave it to the 
benevolence of the Legislature, for, modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it 
in such a manner as to clear it from ambiguity. No man can claim this indulgence of right. It 
may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the 
discretion of the Government. If this stands part of the constitution, it will be a question before 
the Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of the militia, 
whether it comports with this declaration or not. It is extremely injudicious to intermix matters 
of doubt with fundamentals.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 751 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) [hereinafter 
Gales]. 
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generality of persons will have recourse to these pretexts to get excused from bearing 
arms.”19 
Madison’s CO exemption survived the first round of congressional debate, but 
went on to die in a committee, which excised it without explanation. Though they did 
not mention exemption from bearing arms specifically, several House drafts of what 
would go on to become the First Amendment also included provisions against 
“infringe[ments]” on “rights of conscience.”20 These provisions were also rejected, 
this time by the Senate, and unfortunately “[n]o record of the Senate debate 
survives.”21 
In concluding our discussion of early CO exemptions, it is important to note that 
the colonial and post-Revolution legislatures granted the exemptions “for practical as 
well as philosophical reasons,”22 and that they largely considered CO exemptions an 
“indulgence” of eccentric sects rather than a free exercise right.23 It is also important 
to emphasize that, even after the passage of the First Amendment, these early state 
laws “respecting the establishment of religion” did not pose any constitutional 
problems. As originally conceived and interpreted, the First Amendment applied only 
to Congress, and was actually designed to permit states to continuing regulating 
religion (for example, by exempting Quakers and other sects from conscription) 
without interference from the new federal government.24 
B. The Civil War and the First Federal CO Exemption 
In 1863, mid-way through the Civil War, Congress implemented the first federal 
draft in U.S. history.25 The Enrollment Act (also known as the Civil War Military Draft 
Act) resurrected Revolutionary War-era penalty fee and hired substitution exemptions, 
but it did not contain an CO exemption.26 This surprised the Quakers, as they had been 
“diligently lobbying Congress and knew that Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton and 
President Lincoln”—both of whom were from Quaker backgrounds—“were both 
known to be sympathetic to their cause.”27 
The “Quakers were determined to acquire a legal guarantee against conscription,” 
as they continued to oppose (as they had during the Revolutionary War) indirect 
support of war through exemption fees or the provision of substitute conscripts.28 They 
 
19 Id. at 767. 
20 Id. at 766. 
21 JOHN WITTE & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT 80 (4th ed. 2016). 
22 Chambers, supra note 7, at 26 (emphasis added). 
23 West, supra note 16, at 377. 
24 The First Amendment’s religion clauses were made applicable to the states only after the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the clauses in Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
25 ROSTKER, supra note 1, at 22. 
26 Enrollment Act, ch. 75, sec. 18, 12 Stat. 731, 783 (1863). 
27 Tara J. Carnahan, The Quakers and Conscientious Objection, 20 HISTORIA 1, 7 (2011). 
28 Id. 
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quickly “organized a committee that traveled to Washington” to lobby for a CO 
exemption.29 Their efforts paid off, as Congress amended the Enrollment Act in 
February 1864 to include the following alternative-service exemption: “members of 
religious denominations conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are 
prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious 
denomination, shall, when drafted into the military service, be considered non-
combatants.”30 
A compelling case can be made that this first federal CO exemption violated the 
First Amendment. It was passed as a direct result of lobbying by an established 
religious group and tailor-made to cover only them, so it is hard to see it as anything 
other than a “law respecting an establishment of religion.”31 But because the 
exemption was passed near the end of the Civil War, no constitutional challenge 
reached the Supreme Court before the conflict ended. 
C. Reynolds and Religious Exemptions 
When Congress passed the constitutionally-questionable federal CO exemption in 
1864, constitutional jurisprudence regarding religion was entirely undeveloped. It 
would be fifteen more years before the Supreme Court decided its first case involving 
the First Amendment’s religion clauses.32 That case, Reynolds v. United States,33 
concluded that the Free Exercise clause does not provide conscience-based 
exemptions from legal duties. 
In Reynolds, a Mormon living in the Utah Territory was charged with violating a 
congressional criminal statute that prohibited polygamy in federal territories.34 The 
defendant argued that polygamy was a matter of religious duty for Mormons,35 and 
that the Constitution provided Mormons with a free exercise exemption from 
compliance with the statute.36 The Court rejected this argument by adopting a 
Jeffersonian interpretation of the First Amendment,37 holding that “Congress was 
 
29 Id. at 7–8. 
30 Enrollment Act, ch. 13, sec. 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9 (1864). 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
32 See Harrop A. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PENN. L. REV. 806, 822 
(1958) (stating that Reynolds was “the first case to consider the free exercise clause”); infra 
note 65 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court’s first Establishment Clause 
case was heard in the late 1940s). 
33 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
34 Id. at 161. 
35 The plaintiff explained “that the failing or refusing to practise polygamy by such male 
members of said church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and that the 
penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come.” Id. at 161. 
36 Id. at 166. 
37 The Court began its analysis by noting that “[t]he word ‘religion’ is not defined in the 
Constitution,” and that it must “go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning.” The Court 
then turned to Jefferson, “an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the [First Amendment],” 
to determine what “religion” meant. The Court relied chiefly on the Virginia Statute for 
Religious Freedom and the famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association to determine how 
Jefferson conceived of “religion” and religious freedom. The Court began by noting that early 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/5
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deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”38  
To provide legal exemptions based on religious belief, the Court warned, “would 
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could 
exist only in name under such circumstances.”39 Quoting with approval Jefferson’s 
Danbury Baptist letter, the Court acknowledged “the rights of conscience” as being 
among man’s “natural rights,” but then qualified that “he has no natural right in 
opposition to his social duties.”40 
The Reynolds holding had serious implications for federal CO exemptions. In fact, 
since Reynolds concluded that “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over 
mere opinion”41 by the First Amendment, it could be argued that any exemption based 
on a conscientious belief, whether sacred or secular in origin, constitutes a violation 
of the Establishment Clause.42 
D. WWI Draft Law and the Selective Draft Law Cases 
When Congress began debating reinstating the draft during WWI, “church leaders 
and political activists descended on Washington to advocate for provisions for those 
who rejected war on religious grounds.”43 The Reynolds case should have given 
 
states forced citizens to subsidize religions “whose tenets they could not and did not subscribe,” 
and punished people for “entertaining heretical opinions.” This was the evil that Jefferson set 
out to cure through the Virginia Statute of Freedom and the First Amendment. The Court first 
cited the Virginia Statute of Freedom’s recital, which states that “to suffer the civil magistrate 
to intrude his powers into the field of opinion” would “destroy[] all religious liberty.” The Court 
then cited the Danbury Baptist letter as evidence of Jefferson’s understanding of the First 
Amendment, in which Jefferson wrote that “religion is a matter which lies solely between man 
and his God; . . . [and] that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not 
opinions.” Id. at 162-64 (emphasis added). 
38 Id. at 164. 
39 Id. at 167. 
40 Id. at 164. 
41 Id. 
42 Since Reynolds defines religion as “mere opinion” regarding morality, it could be argued 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting” subjective moral beliefs, whether based on 
religious principles or secular philosophy. The conclusion that Congress must stay neutral when 
it comes to moral controversies of any type is supported by Jefferson’s 1818 report discussing 
the University of Virginia’s original curriculum. In that report, Jefferson wrote that in order to 
maintain “conformity with the principles of our constitution,” “we have proposed no professor 
of Divinity,” and even secular courses of ethical lectures may develop only “[those] moral 
obligations . . . in which all sects agree.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA TO THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(1818). 
43 CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF 
THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN 58 (2008). The Washington Post colorfully described a 
meeting between leaders of the Hutterites, a historic peace church, and the Secretary of War as 
being “the most numerous collection of whiskers the War Department has seen in many a day.” 
Id. 
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Congress pause about the constitutionality of CO exemptions. Washington, however, 
was “so distracted by the larger issues of war mobilization that it had little time to 
devote to the CO question.”44 
As during the Civil War, the peace churches again “got most of what they wanted,” 
and a CO exemption was added to the WWI conscription act.45 Congress, being aware 
that “[e]ven the perception of certain groups being favored could produce a fair 
amount of backlash among the general public,” carefully crafted the exemption to limit 
it to the historic peace churches.46 The Act exempted only members of a “well-
recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose 
existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form.”47 
The WWI conscription act was immediately challenged as unconstitutional. In 
January 1918, less than a year after Congress enacted the Selective Services Act, the 
Supreme Court upheld it against a number of constitutional challenges.48 Among these 
challenges were a claim that the CO exemption was “repugnant to the First 
Amendment” as “an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free 
exercise thereof . . . .”49 
The case was decided “at an early stage in the development of First Amendment 
doctrine;”50 decades before the Court would declare the First Amendment to be 
incorporated by the Fourteenth and subsequently embark on long, tortuous 
jurisprudential journey to map the boundaries of the First Amendment51 (a journey 
that continues to this day). The 1918 Court, therefore, may have held a simplistic view 
of the First Amendment, and simply assumed that the nation’s long tradition of 
granting an exemption to religious objectors was ipso facto evidence that the 
exemption was compatible with the Constitution. In any case, the Court devoted only 
a single sentence to the CO exemption challenge, dismissively brushing the claim 
aside by stating “we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.”52 
E. WWII Draft Law and the Kauten and Berman Cases 
On the eve of U.S. entry into WWII, Congress began drafting the Burke-
Wadsworth conscription bill, which “contained many features of the Selective Service 
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 NICHOLAS A. KREHBIEL, PROTECTOR OF CONSCIENCE, PROPONENT OF SERVICE: GENERAL 
LEWIS B. HERSHEY AND ALTERNATIVE SERVICE DURING WORLD WAR II 84 (2009). See also 
JEAN-FRANÇOIS CARON, DISOBEDIENCE IN THE MILITARY 34 (2018) (“The use of the words 
‘well-recognized religious sects or organizations’ actually restricted the exemption only to the 
historic peace churches.”) 
47 Select Service Act, ch. 15, sec 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917) (emphasis added). 
48 See generally Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
49 Id. at 390.  
50 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 n.17 (1971). 
51 See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) (“It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence is a mess—both hopelessly confused and deeply contradictory.”). 
52 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 390. 
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System which persisted through the Vietnam era.”53 Just as they did during the Civil 
War and WWI, leaders of the historic peace churches came forward to lobby Congress 
to include a CO exemption to the draft.54 But unlike during past wars, other types of 
pacifists also came forward to ask that a more liberal conscientious objector clause be 
included.55  
In addition to leaders of the historic peace churches, representatives of Catholic, 
Methodist, and Adventist groups, along with the ACLU, proposed their own versions 
of a CO exemption.56 The latter groups all proposed exemptions based on the 
individual conscience of the objector, not based on the objector’s membership in a 
church that promotes pacifism.57 Rejecting the more secular proposals, the House 
adopted almost “verbatim” the proposal put forth by the Quakers, which exempted 
one “who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to 
participation in war in any form.”58 
It is difficult to determine what exactly Congress intended by adopting this 
language, as the congressional debate was sparse and does not indicate a consensus 
one way or the other. “The Committee Reports are entirely silent on the subject,” and 
even the statutory language itself “did not originate with Members of Congress” but 
was rather “language proposed by the Quakers.”59 It seems quite likely that Congress 
intended to perpetuate the centuries-old status quo and, in a rush to move on to other 
matters, simply adopted the proposal put forth by the most venerable of the peace 
churches which, by its reference to “religious training,” appeared limited to members 
of churches with pacifistic doctrines. 
The opacity of Congress’s objectives, coupled with the statute’s “vague language,” 
“permitted differing court interpretations of its scope.”60 In United States v. Kauten, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, without citing any evidence of 
congressional intent, that: 
 
53 Richard P. Fox, Conscientious Objection to War: The Background and a Current Appraisal, 
31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 77, 81 (1982). 
54 Donald Eugene Houston, The Legislative History of the Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940 39 
(August 1969) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Oklahoma State University) (“Traditionally pacifist 
groups, or advocates of non-combatant service, such as the Quakers, the Mennonites, and the 
Seventh Day Adventists appeared and repeated their requests for exemptions.”). 
55 Id. at 93 (“The pacifists—both individuals and religious groups—contended that 
compulsory service as here proposed violated the conscience of those who were not members 
of historically pacifist groups. Adequate provisions, they argued, should be written into the bill 
to cover anyone who might refuse service, claiming conscientious objection.”). 
56 Volunteer Armed Forces and Selective Service, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Volunteer Armed Service, 92nd Cong. 83 (1972). 
57 Id. 
58 Selective Service and Amnesty, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac. & Proc. of 
the Sen. Jud. Comm., 92nd Cong. 509 (1972) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Bela A. Silard, 
Chairman, Comm. on Conscientious Objection & Draft of the Amer. Ethical Union). 
59 Id. at 509–10.  
60 Timothy G. Todd, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1734, 1735 
(1969). 
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the provisions of the present statute are more generous [than 
previous exemptions] for they take into account the characteristics 
of a skeptical generation and make the existence of a conscientious 
scruple against war in any form, rather than allegiance to a definite 
religious group or creed, the basis of exemption.61 
The Kauten court then asserted that a definition of religion “is incapable of 
compression into a few words,” and that any objection to war based on the guidance 
of “an inward mentor, call it conscience or God” could be “the basis of exemption 
under the Act.”62 
The Ninth Circuit, however, reached a different conclusion. In Berman v. United 
States, the Ninth Circuit resorted to the Webster’s dictionary in defining religion as 
“[a]n apprehension, awareness, or conviction of the existence of a supreme being.”63 
The court then rejected the appellant’s claim for an exemption based on his socialist 
convictions, holding that “philosophy and morals and social policy without the 
concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the sense of that term as it is used in 
the statute.”64 
F. Everson and Religious Exemptions 
Between the end of WWII and the beginning of the Korean War, the Supreme 
Court decided, for the first time in its history,65 an Establishment Clause case 
(Reynolds technically involved a Free Exercise claim66). That 1947 case, Everson v. 
Board of Education, relied heavily on Reynolds in holding that the First Amendment, 
as incorporated by the Fourteenth, is essentially a federal version of the Virginia 
Statute of Freedom.67 The case had profound ramifications for religion-based68 CO 
exemptions, as the following passage shows: 
 
61 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943). 
62 Id. 
63 Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1946). 
64 Id. at 384. 
65 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 663 
(1968) (stating that Everson “was, chronologically speaking, the first Establishment Clause case 
decided by the high bench”). 
66 Though Reynolds is a Free Exercise case, the Everson Court recognized “the interrelation 
of these complementary clauses” and held that “[t]here is every reason to give the same 
application and broad interpretation [of the ‘free exercise’ clause in Reynolds] to the 
‘establishment of religion’ clause.” Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
67 Id. at 29. 
68 Arguably, Everson also renders a secular CO exemption unconstitutional. As discussed 
earlier, Reynolds defined religion simply as “moral opinion,” and Everson cited that Free 
Exercise case in asserting that “[t]here is every reason to give the same application and broad 
interpretation to the ‘establishment of religion’ clause.” Id. at 15. One can imagine how 
exemptions based on “moral opinion” could present a major hazard to the democratic system: 
Congress could, for example, hand out legal exemptions or benefits based on a citizen’s view 
about a morally-charged but not necessarily religious issue (such as abortion or same-sex 
marriage) that divides the public along partisan lines. 
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The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid 
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force 
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing 
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance . . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of 
separation between church and State.”69 
CO exemptions tailored to peace churches clearly “aid one religion, . . . or prefer 
one religion over another,” and even a broader exemption based on personal religious 
belief rather than membership in a pacifist denomination would “aid all religions.”70 
During the Vietnam War era, courts recognized that CO exemptions could “influence 
a person to go to”71 peace churches, and expressed concern that “religious 
‘conversions’ of convenience” could occur on such a mass scale that it “might well 
upset the orderly administration of the selective service system.”72 Catholics were 
“punished for . . . professing religious beliefs” about “just wars” (because the 
exemption required opposition to all wars),73 atheists were punished for “disbelief” in 
a Supreme Being,74 members of mainstream denominations were punished for “church 
attendance” at non-peace churches,75 and religious non-conformists were punished for 
“non-attendance” of any church.76 
G. Korean War Draft Law 
When Congress began debating legislation to reinstate the draft in anticipation of 
war in Korea, the peace churches again lobbied for the inclusion of a CO exemption. 
Mennonite and Brethren representatives appeared at committee meetings to argue in 
 
69 Id. at 15–16 (emphasis added). 
70 Id. at 15. 
71 Id. 
72 United States v. Taylor, 351 F. 2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1965). 
73 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15; see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
74 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166–67 (1965) (the draft board denied the plaintiff’s 
claim for lack of belief in a “supreme being”). 
75 Martha A. Field, Problems of Proof in Conscientious Objector Cases, 120 PA. L. REV. 870, 
930 n.261 (1972) (“[S]tudies show that draft boards are most likely to grant claims by members 
of pacifist churches, that persons affiliated with other churches are the next most favored group, 
and that persons not affiliated with any church have the most difficult time having their claims 
sustained. . . . [C]hurch affiliation (and particularly affiliation with traditional peace churches) 
is often controlling.”). 
76 Henrietta Caroline Milner, Constitutional Rights and Conscientious Objectors: The Status 
of Non-Religious Objectors 18–19 (August, 1969) (M.A. thesis, Oklahoma State University) 
(“[S]ome boards defined religion to mean an outward expression of church attendance or church 
affiliation.”). 
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favor of an expansive exemption based on individual conscience, but Congress 
showed a “lack of interest” in these proposals.77 Not only was Congress not interested 
in broadening the exemption, it actually “sought to foreclose the broader Kauten 
interpretation” of conscientious objection.78 
In a closed-door session,79 Congress adopted a CO exemption that borrowed the 
“religious training and belief” language from the 1940 conscription law, but further 
qualified that this meant “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being, . . . 
but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code.”80 “The legislative history of the 1948 statute is, for a 
number of reasons, rather sparse,”81 but it is clear that Congress designed the CO 
exemption to ensure that future court decisions would resemble Berman and not 
Kauten. “Congress incorporated [Berman] not only into the legislative history,” as the 
Senate report “specifically cit[ed] Berman,”82 “but also in the very words of the Act”83 
by closely following the Berman court’s language. 
Interestingly, the Senate report concluded its comments on the CO exemption by 
stating that “[t]he exemption is viewed as a privilege.”84 This view is in line with the 
historical understanding of the CO exemption,85 and was probably intended to ward 
off claims that the statute’s exemption was rooted in a Free Exercise right. But the 
statement also seems oblivious to the Everson decision handed down the year before, 
and reinforces this Article’s thesis that the CO exemption could be constitutionally 
challenged for providing “privileges” (in the Senate’s own words) on the basis of 
religion.  
H. Part I Conclusion 
Leading up to the Vietnam War, it was quite obvious that the CO exemption rested 
on constitutionally-shaky grounds. It was clearly a concession carved out for the 
benefit of religious groups, as the historic peace churches had to lobby for an 
exemption during every draft in U.S. history. Congress’s own description of it as a 
“privilege” afforded to believers in a “Supreme Being” demonstrates that it was a “law 
respecting an establishment of religion.” 
 
77 Hearing, supra note 58, at 512. 
78 Todd, supra note 60, at 1736. See also CURTIS W. TARR, BY THE NUMBERS: THE REFORM 
OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 1970–1972 82 (1981) (“[M]embers of both armed services 
committees in Congress worried that the concept [of ‘religious training and belief’] might 
become loose and thus unenforceable. . . . From testimony given then and later, the committee 
members clearly intended to restrict this provision of the law.”). 
79 Hearing, supra note 58, at 511. 
80 Select Service Act, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 613 (1948) (emphasis added). 
81 Hearing, supra note 58, at 511. 
82 Todd, supra note 60, at 1736 n.21. 
83 Jay R. Dingledy, Welsh v. United States: A New Substantive Definition for Conscientious 
Objector, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 662 (1971). 
84 S. Rep. No. 80-1268, at 14 (1948). 
85 See West, supra note 23, at 377 and accompanying text. 
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Looking back, however, it is easy to understand why Congress began this habit of 
providing a blatantly unconstitutional exemption. When Congress instituted the first 
federal draft during the Civil War, there was already a 200-year-old history of 
exempting members of peace churches from conscription.86 Congress simply 
succumbed to the inertia of tradition, leaving it to the courts to handle any 
constitutional problems (as Congress is in the habit of doing). This strategy, however, 
would lead to disaster during the Vietnam War. 
II.THE CO EXEMPTION AND THE DEMISE OF THE DRAFT DURING THE 
VIETNAM WAR 
The U.S. entered the Vietnam War with the constitutionality of the CO exemption 
unresolved. But rather than strike the unconstitutional exemption down, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in a strange line of cases, broadened the exemption in an effort to save 
it. By the end of the war, virtually every draftee, from the most devout of Amishmen 
to the most godless of hippies, qualified for the CO exemption. 
The Court’s broadening of the CO exemption arguably did what the war itself and 
millions of anti-war activists could not do: end the draft. After 1970, when the Court 
held that secular anti-war beliefs qualified an individual for the “religious” CO 
exemption, the Selective Service System completely broke down, and Congress 
abolished the draft soon after. This Part discusses the Court’s two major Vietnam-era 
CO exemption cases—United States v. Seeger and United States v. Welsh—and how 
they fatally destabilized the draft system. 
 
 
 
 
A. Seeger and the Subsequent Revision of the Draft Law 
“In 1965,” despite a steady escalation of conflict in Vietnam, “few people applied 
for conscientious objector status.”87 The (arguably) narrow88 1948 exemption was still 
in effect, and the 300-year-old status quo of limiting the exemption to members of the 
historic peace churches was still being followed. Many draftees who might have been 
interested in applying did not do so because they “knew that existing . . . CO criteria 
excluded them.”89  
But in March of 1965, the 300-year-old tradition of limiting the CO exemption to 
peace church members ended abruptly. That month, the Supreme Court issued a 
decision in a case brought by Daniel Andrew Seeger, a lapsed Catholic who applied 
 
86 KREHBIEL, supra note 46, at 62–63 (stating that the first CO exemptions date back to 1663 
in the Massachusetts and Rhode Island colonies). 
87 Robert A. Seeley, Vietnam: The War We Cannot Escape, A FURTHER FLIGHT, 
www.givewings.com/writings/essays_on_war/vietnam.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
88 Curtis W. Tarr, Selective Service and Conscientious Objectors, 57 A.B.A. J. 976, 978 
(1971) (noting that General Hershey, the Director of the Selective Service System, expressed 
concern to the House Committee on Armed Services that the wording of 1948 exemption “might 
prove the intent of Congress to restrict the provisions of the act,” but “might also be interpreted 
as an intent further to broaden the act”). 
89 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 37 (1975). 
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for a CO exemption based on his secular moral values.90 The draft board had denied 
Seeger’s application for exemption “because his conscientious objections were not 
dependent upon ‘a belief in a relation to a Supreme Being’” as required by the 1948 
statute.91 
Seeger appealed the draft board’s decision, arguing that a CO exemption based on 
“religious training and belief” in a “Supreme Being” violated the Establishment 
Clause. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals—the same circuit that issued the Kauten 
ruling—agreed with Seeger and held that the “Supreme Being” limitation was 
unconstitutional.92 In a conclusion that reflects the argument that Vietnam was a hot 
battlefront in a Cold War against communism, the Second Circuit held: 
[T]he Supreme Court [has] acknowledged that “[w]e are a religious 
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Our 
disposition of this appeal is in keeping with this declaration. It has 
often been noted that the principal distinction between the free 
world and the Marxist nations is traceable to democracy’s concern 
for the rights of the individual citizen, as opposed to the collective 
mass of society. And this dedication to the freedom of the 
individual, of which our Bill of Rights is the most eloquent 
expression, is in large measure the result of the nation’s religious 
heritage. Indeed, we here respect the right of Daniel Seeger to 
believe what he will largely because of the conviction that every 
individual is a child of God; and that Man, created in the image of 
his Maker, is endowed for that reason with human dignity.93 
The U.S. government appealed the Second Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme Court. 
“[T]he fact that Congress chose to draw the line of exemption on the basis of religious 
belief confronted the Court with a difficult constitutional question.”94 It would be 
tough for the Court to reconcile an exemption limited to monotheistic believers with 
Everson, and it might not be able to reconcile any conscience-based exemption with 
Reynolds.95  
The Court ultimately decided to avoid the “difficult constitutional question”96 by 
granting Seeger a CO exemption on statutory grounds, rendering his constitutional 
 
90 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 169 (1965). 
91 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1964). 
92 Id. at 854. 
93 Id. at 854–55. 
94 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS 
AND INTERPRETATION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES TO JUNE 28, 2012, S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 1100 (2013). 
95 See supra note 42. 
96 118 CONG. REC. 13, 176 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dellums) (“The Seeger case did not 
reach the constitutional question of whether the state might require a belief in God as a condition 
for exemption.”). 
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challenge moot.97 Applying the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance,”98 in which a 
court may go “to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on 
constitutional grounds,”99 the Court held that Seeger, who expressly “[r]efus[ed] to 
assert a simple belief or disbelief in a deity” and “reject[ed] dependence upon [a] 
Creator for a guide to morality,”100 actually satisfied the requirements of the statute.101 
In doing so, “the Court chose to avoid [the Establishment Clause challenge] by a 
somewhat disingenuous interpretation of the statute.”102 
The Court first held that by “using the expression ‘Supreme Being,’ rather than the 
designation ‘God,’” Congress was showing its intent to “embrace all religions and to 
exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.”103 But since 
Seeger’s views on war were philosophical rather than religious, the Court went on to 
blur the line between the religious and the secular. The Court, which routinely wields 
the “tool of language” in dealing with “fundamental104 questions of man’s predicament 
in life,105 in death,106 [and] in final judgment107 and retribution,”108 held that it could 
not interpret the meaning of “Supreme Being” with precision because “in no field of 
human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication 
of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man’s predicament in 
life, in death or in final judgment and retribution.”109 
The Court then defined religion in a way that is pure Sixties. Focusing heavily on 
Eastern spirituality, the Court held that religion could be thought of as “a way of life 
envisioning . . . the day when all men can live together in perfect understanding and 
peace,” and that the “Supreme Being” could be conceived as “the transcendental 
reality which is truth, knowledge and bliss.”110 In an astounding display of historical 
revisionism, the Court asserted that Congress intended this to be a broadly applicable 
 
97 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185–86. 
98 The doctrine was first elaborated by Justice Brandeis in his concurrence to Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), which noted 
the “[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by the 
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.” 
99 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 189 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
100 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1964). 
101 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188. 
102 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 94, at 1054. 
103 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 
104 The Supreme Court is a constitutional court, and as such it confronts the most 
“fundamental” questions of law. 
105 The Court hears cases concerning virtually every stage and aspect of human life, from 
conception to death. 
106 The Court hears cases concerning the death penalty. 
107 The Supreme Court is, of course, the court of “last resort.” 
108 The Court hears cases concerning the criminal law, which is partially retributive in nature. 
109 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965). 
110 Id. at 174–75. 
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exemption because that would be in “keeping with its long established policy of not 
picking and choosing among religious beliefs,”111 ignoring the 300-year-long tradition 
of limiting the CO exemption to members of historic peace churches.112 
Though Seeger himself was not a hippie, the Seeger Court’s language could not 
have been more conducive to the counterculture. Suddenly, anyone who held even the 
haziest notions of spirituality could claim an exemption that previously had been 
limited to small, insular, deeply-conservative sects. Perhaps even a psychedelic vision 
of peace sign during an acid trip,113 the “mellow feelings of warmth and safety” 
experienced after popping a “love drug,”114 or the “consciousness-raising” powers of 
marijuana115 could provide a basis for draft exemption, as some law professors quite 
persuasively asserted at the time.116 
The anti-war movement quickly seized on the decision as a strategy for draft 
resistance. The Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors (“CCCO”), which was 
a support organization for secular COs,117 encouraged draftees to “take full advantage 
of the opportunity to qualify which the Court has given them.”118 They emphasized to 
atheistic CO applicants that “atheism was not at issue in the Seeger case, for Seeger 
had left the Supreme Being question unanswered,” and that they might still qualify if 
they “state affirmatively what they believe rather than what they do not.”119 
For the military brass, the decision could not have come at a more inopportune 
time. Curtis Tarr, a director of the Selective Service during the Vietnam War, 
explained as follows: 
Shock waves followed, thundering throughout Selective Service 
and in the armed services committees as well. The decision, handed 
down on March 8, 1965, came just a few months before President 
Johnson made his ominous pledge to send 50,000 men to Vietnam. 
[Draft c]alls increased, as did protests to the draft.120 
The Selective Service was particularly concerned about dealing with additional 
administrative burdens as a result of Seeger. “A 1966-67 advisory panel headed by 
 
111 Id. at 175. 
112 Id. at 188.  
113 NEIL HAMILTON, DICTIONARY OF 1960S COUNTERCULTURE IN AMERICA (ABC-CLIO 
COMPANION) 87 (1997) (noting the role that LSD played in the ambitions of hippies to “create 
a self-sufficient settlement around psychedelic visions of peace and love” in Haight-Ashbury). 
114 PHILIP JENKINS, SYNTHETIC PANICS: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF DESIGNER DRUGS 87 
(1999). 
115 ROBERT ROSKIND, MEMOIRS OF AN EX-HIPPIE: SEVEN YEARS IN THE COUNTERCULTURE 74 
(2004). 
116 See generally Joel Jay Finer, Psychedelics and Religious Freedom, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 667 
(1968). 
117 SCOTT H. BENNETT, RADICAL PACIFISM: THE WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE AND GANDHIAN 
NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 1915-1963 145 (2003). 
118 J. BARTON HARRISON ET AL., HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 39 (1968). 
119 Id. 
120 TARR, supra note 78, at 83. 
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General Mark W. Clark warned that Seeger would generate ‘an ever-increasing 
number of unjustified appeals for exemption from military service.’”121 These fears 
were well-founded, as appeals of draft classifications rose from 4 per 1,000 in 1965 
(the year Seeger was decided) to 102 per 1,000 in 1969.122 
The Selective Service apparently decided that the best strategy was to not call 
attention to the Seeger decision. Former Director Tarr noted in a memoir that the 
Selective Service “never had published instructions to its boards following the 
landmark ruling in 1965.”123 In addition, the “Selective Service provided quite literally 
no information to registrants on . . . conscientious objection,”124 and President Ford’s 
clemency board discovered a decade later that many potential COs did not file an 
application because they were uninformed about Seeger.125 Some applicants even 
“claimed that they had been discouraged from applying.”126 
Despite the Selective Service’s reluctance to implement the decision, “Seeger led 
to a major increase in the number of CO applications.”127 In 1966, the first full year 
that the Seeger decision was in effect, the ratio of CO exemptions to actual inductions 
rose to an astounding 40 times higher than it was during WWII.128 
In 1967, Congress debated how to amend the CO exemption in response to Seeger 
and, as one congressman put it, “go[] back to the oldtime religion.”129 The military 
advised Congress that, against the background of that Supreme Court decision, 
removing the Supreme Being clause would have to be clearly recognized as 
Congressional intent to narrow the standard.130 Congress followed the military’s 
advice and removed the “Supreme Being” language while leaving the “religious 
training and belief” requirement.131 
B. Welsh and the Collapse of the Selective Service System 
In 1970, the Supreme Court again returned to the CO exemption issue in United 
States v. Welsh. The Welsh Court noted that the “controlling facts in this case are 
strikingly similar to those in Seeger,” with the main difference being that “Welsh could 
sign [the CO exemption form] only after striking the words ‘my religious training,’” 
 
121 Tarr, supra note 88, at 977. 
122 Seeley, supra note 87, at 4. 
123 TARR, supra note 78, at 85. 
124 Seeley, supra note 87, at 4. 
125 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, supra note 89, at 38. 
126 Id. 
127 Seeley, supra note 87, at 4. 
128 Chambers, supra note 6, at 42. 
129 Extension of the Universal Military Training and Service Act: Hearings Before the House 
Comm. on Armed Services, H.R. Rep. No. 12, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
130 Tarr, supra note 88, at 978. 
131 Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3801-3820 (1967). 
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while Seeger’s case turned on his lack of belief in a “Supreme Being.”132 Welsh, 
therefore, was a perfect test case for the 1967 revision to the CO exemption. 
Like Seeger, Welsh asserted that the religious component of the CO exemption 
violated the Establishment Clause. And like it did in Seeger, the Court applied the 
“constitutional avoidance” doctrine in Welsh to avoid confronting the Establishment 
Clause claim. “Knowing the intent of Congress when it enacted the 1967 
amendments,” Selective Service Director Tarr explained, “the Court still preferred to 
interpret ‘religious training’ broadly rather than to discard the entire section of the law 
as defective under the First Amendment.”133 
The Welsh Court held that “[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds [anti-war] 
beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content,” those beliefs qualify as 
“religious” under the statute, even though the statute explicitly stated that “religious 
belief . . . does not include . . . a merely personal moral code.”134 Though the Court 
recognized that “Welsh was far more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that 
his views were religious,” it dismissed his characterizations of his own beliefs as 
irrelevant because “very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word 
‘religious.’”135 The Court concluded by essentially writing a secular morals and ethics 
exemption into the statute, holding that it “exempts from military service all those 
whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,” have 
led them to pacifism.136 
It is hard to tell why the Court chose to ignore Congress’s obvious intentions and 
adopt such an implausible interpretation of the statute. Though “the words of a statute 
may be strained ‘in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt’”137 
under the “constitutional avoidance” doctrine, the Welsh Court went far beyond 
“strain[ing]” the statute’s language and directly contradicted the statute’s plain text.138 
The Welsh interpretation—that the statute defines atheism as religion, and that an 
“individual[’s] deeply and sincerely h[e]ld . . . beliefs” do not constitute a “merely 
personal moral code”—is simply too far-fetched to believe. In his concurrence, Justice 
Harlan described the majority opinion as being a product of an “Alice-in-Wonderland 
world where words have no meaning.”139 
The most likely explanation is that the Court was reluctant to overturn a 300-year-
old exemption by judicial fiat, as this could undermine confidence in the rule of law.140 
 
132 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338 (1970). 
133 Tarr, supra note 88, at 979. 
134 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340. 
135 Id. at 341. 
136 Id. at 340–44 (emphasis added). 
137 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
138 See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he liberties taken with the statute 
. . . cannot be justified in the name of the familiar doctrine of construing federal statutes in a 
manner that will avoid possible constitutional infirmities in them. There are limits to the 
permissible application of that doctrine, and . . . those limits were crossed.”). 
139 Id. at 354. 
140 The Court is a deeply conservative institution, as many of its doctrines (such as stare 
decisis) seek to preserve the status quo. Even supposedly “progressive” decisions, such as Roe 
v. Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges, are couched as preserving time-tested practices and 
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It may have been trying to signal to Congress that the exemption was unconstitutional, 
as concurring justices in both Seeger141 and Welsh142 spelled out. The Court may have 
been trying to force Congress to abolish the exemption itself, thus taking care of the 
constitutional problem in a democratic fashion. 
If that was indeed the Court’s strategy, Congress did not take the bait. The 
exemption stayed on the books, and vast numbers of draftees took advantage. “In the 
first month after Welsh, Selective Service received 100,000 applications for CO 
status,”143 which rivaled the number of CO exemptions issued over the previous five 
years.144  
CO applicants who had their applications denied after Welsh were (quite 
reasonably) far more likely to appeal. “By 1971, the number of appeals had far 
outstripped the Selective Service’s ability to process them. The system was on the 
verge of breakdown from the sheer weight of perfectly legal paperwork.”145 
Welsh also provided draft law violators with a silver-bullet defense. In 1970, the 
first year that the Welsh ruling was available as a defense, acquittals of defendants 
charged with Selective Service Acts violations outnumbered convictions for the first 
time in the Vietnam War era.146 Acquittals would continue to outnumber convictions 
until the draft was abolished.147 
Perhaps the most astounding statistical evidence of Welsh’s impact is the ratio of 
CO exemptions to actual inductions into the military. In 1972, after the Selective 
Service issued revised CO exemption guidelines to draft boards that incorporated 
Welsh, “more registrants were classified as COs than were inducted into the army.”148 
To say that “[s]uch a phenomenon was unprecedented in American history” would be 
 
principles. Roe, for example, went to extraordinary lengths to show that the West has historically 
permitted abortion, with a historical review that reached all the way back to the Achaemenid 
Empire. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973). Obergefell took pains to demonstrate that 
same-sex marriage was consistent with “essential attributes of th[e] right [to marry] based in 
history [and] tradition.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
141 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“If I read the statute differently from 
the Court, I would have difficulties. For then those who embraced one religious faith rather than 
another would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we held in Sherbert v. 
Verner, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”). 
142 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[H]aving chosen to exempt, [Congress] 
cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular 
beliefs on the other. Any such distinctions are not, in my view, compatible with the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”). 
143 Seeley, supra note 87, at 4. 
144 Chambers, supra note 6, at 42 (stating that there were 170,000 CO exemptions issued 
between 1965-1970). 
145 Seeley, supra note 87, at 4. 
146 ROSS GREGORY, COLD WAR AMERICA, 1946 TO 1990 277 (2014). 
147 Id. 
148 Chambers, supra note 6, at 42. 
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an understatement, as there were only 1.5 exemptions per thousand inductees during 
WWI and WWII.149 
After Welsh, “[t]he draft had, for all practical purposes, broken down.”150 Robert 
A. Seeley, the executive director of CCCO during the Vietnam War, asserted that 
Seeger and especially Welsh “[a]rguably . . . broke the back of the draft.”151 In January 
1973, two and a half years after Welsh was handed down, the draft was abolished.152 
C. Part II Conclusion 
The Court’s broadening of the CO exemption, and Congress’s failure to follow up 
by revoking the exemption, clearly played a major role in the abolition of the Selective 
Service System, and possibly even the U.S. pullout from Vietnam two months later. 
If Seeger had not breathed life into the draft resistance movement in 1965, and if Welsh 
had not strained the Selective Service to the breaking point in the early 1970s, it is 
possible that the war might have plodded on even longer than it did, and it is also 
possible that the draft system might have emerged from Vietnam intact. 
III. WELSH AND THE POST-VIETNAM MILITARY 
Even after the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Welsh would deliver one final 
blow to the draft. After the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam, the conversation turned to 
what to do about draft evaders, many of whom were living abroad to avoid 
prosecution. Some began arguing that “[t]hose moral and ethical pacifists who went 
into exile or were convicted for refusing to submit to induction prior to 1970,” when 
Welsh was handed down, “should certainly receive amnesty.”153 
In 1974, President Ford announced a controversial conditional amnesty program 
for draft evaders.154 A clemency board system was established to determine if draft 
law violators were eligible to receive a presidential pardon.155 The clemency boards 
would go on to cite Welsh in liberally offering pardon to violators who cited 
conscience as their motive for evading the draft.156 
In a report written for the president one year after the program was instituted, the 
Presidential Clemency Board highlighted the major role Welsh was playing as a 
“Mitigating Factor” in clemency cases.157 The Board reported that nearly half of draft 
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law violators cited ethical oppositions to war as at least a partial motive for evading 
the draft, and that 90% of violations occurred before Welsh was decided.158 “Although 
the court decision was not retroactive,” the Board reported, “we felt it only fair to give 
credit to applicants who received convictions simply because they were brought to 
trial before Welsh.”159  
With Ford’s clemency program having established a precedent for granting 
amnesty for draft evaders, President Carter would eventually issue a blanket pardon 
for all Vietnam draft violations in 1977.160 Though the nation as a whole was ready to 
move on at that point, the pardon of “draft dodgers” was understandably unpopular 
with Vietnam veterans.161 Why, after all, should they have suffered through the horrors 
of the war when they could have defied their draft orders and later received a pardon? 
After the mass amnesty for draft violations, it is very difficult to imagine the draft 
being reinstated. What little institutional credibility the draft had left after Vietnam 
was likely lost as a result of the presidential pardons. As one of the major justifications 
for amnesty, Welsh helped steer the U.S. down an irrevocable course towards a 
permanently all-volunteer military. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In a haunting echo of Rep. Scott’s 1789 prophesy,162 former Selective Service 
director Tarr predicted that, with the breakdown of established religion and the rise of 
individualistic moral development, it will be impossible to separate sincere 
conscientious objectors from the opportunistic: 
I cannot imagine conscientious objection becoming easier to define 
in the future. Although traditional beliefs in God are less widely 
accepted, more young people worry about the problems of 
conscience. Boards, even those composed of professional people, 
would have difficulty determining who really passes the tests 
handed down thus far by the courts.163 
Faced with this impossible task, if the U.S. government ever wishes to reinstate 
the draft while avoiding a repeat of the post-Welsh mass exemptions, it will have to 
completely abolish the CO exemption. 
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